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IMBALANCES LOOKING FOR 
A POLICY
wynne godley
The latest batch of numbers from the United States makes for a disturbing read.
The growth rate of GDP has been adequate, but the current account deficit was
6.3 percent of GDP in the fourth quarter of 2004, and the terrible trade figures
for January and February promise an even bigger deficit in the first quarter of
2005 (BEA 2005).Let no one suppose that this deterioration is a temporary effect
that will automatically turn around soon.
The dollar, measured against a basket of foreign currencies and adjusted for inflation,
has depreciated by 17 percent during the last three years, but, surprisingly, the terms of trade—
the prices of non-oil imports of goods and services, relative to those of exports—have actually
improved slightly during this period (Fed 2005a; BLS 2005). This trend stands in sharp contrast
to what happened in the mid 1980s,when there was a terms-of-trade deterioration equal to 30 to
40 percent of the dollar depreciation.Non-oil import prices have hardly risen at all relative to the
overall domestic price level, so, with strong private expenditure, it isn’t surprising that imports
have continued to soar, and there is every prospect that they will continue to do so. Imports of
goods and services are now more than 50 percent higher than exports, implying that if output
continues to grow at 3.5 to 4 percent per annum,there will probably have to be a 12 percent annual
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years (a growth rate rarely achieved in the past) to get any sig-
nificant improvement in the overall balance. It looks less and
less likely that the current account deficit will improve at all as
a share of GDP, so long as satisfactory growth continues.
In the fourth quarter of 2004, the federal, state, and local
governments’ combined budget deficit stood at 4.3 percent of
GDP (BEA 2005).The implication of this,taken in conjunction
with the growing current account deficit, is that the expansion
of total demand has been powered entirely by a renewed increase
in private expenditure relative to income, which also happened
in the Goldilocks period of the 1990s; once again, private net
saving has fallen back decisively into negative territory. The
counterpart of increasingly negative net saving, in terms of
debt and lending, is revealed by the new Flow of Funds figures
(Fed 2005b), which have been heavily revised upwards and
show that the growth of debt owed by the nonfinancial private
sector has been reaccelerating. Private debt has reached about
175 percent of private disposable income,another record,while
net lending to the private sector rose from a trough of 8 percent
of income in the third quarter of 2002 to more than 15 percent
in the fourth quarter of last year; this is the extent to which
private income was being supplemented by borrowing. By all
accounts, the growth of lending and debt is financing a raging
boom in housing, reminiscent of that in the United Kingdom
but without any sign yet that it is slowing down.
The public discussion is fractured. There are vacuous sug-
gestions coming from sections of Wall Street that Goldilocks has
been reincarnated and everything is fine. There are right-wing
voices calling unconditionally for cuts in the budget deficit.The
Bush administration seems complacent and, thank goodness, is
not being convinced about cutting the federal budget deficit any
time soon.Many are concerned about the current account deficit.
Some of them fear a big and “disorderly”devaluation of the dol-
lar while others think the dollar isn’t falling enough.No one has
a clear idea about what can actually be done, by whom, and
when. I have no sense that anyone who pontificates on these
matters (outside the Levy Institute!) does so with the benefit of
a comprehensive stock-flow model—the indispensable basis for
competent strategic thinking.
I agree that the current account deficit will eventually have
to be turned around, but doubt whether there can now be a
market solution to this problem. The United States’s largest
creditors, in the Pacific rim countries, obviously want to go on
building a mighty industrial machine, and this is more impor-
tant to them than preserving the value of their dollar assets. So
market forces may be subverted for quite a long time, perhaps
measured in years. Any lasting solution will probably require a
new international order,but at the moment no one has a motive
for bringing this about. After all, the United States enjoys con-
suming nearly 7 percent more than it produces.
What worries me most about the medium-term prospect
is that the state of aggregate demand in the United States,appar-
ently robust, is most precariously based. The only sustainable
configuration of demand growth is one in which exports rise by
a larger amount than “full-employment”imports,but that is no
longer a realistic prospect; it is more likely that the current
account balance will go on exercising a negative influence on
demand for some time.But private debt and borrowing cannot
continue to provide the motor for expansion for more than a
couple of years, particularly if interest rates go on rising. The
growth in private debt must eventually slow down, causing net
lending to fall and thus threatening recession, exactly as hap-
pened in 2000.But there can be no remedy this time in the shape
of a fiscal expansion.A repeat of the 2000–2003 stimulus would
take the budget deficit to 9 percent of GDP! On the other hand,
the prospect of recession would be dangerously increased if
President Bush were to prove a man of his word and really try
to cut the deficit in half during the next four years.
Taking everything together, there is plenty to worry about.
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